Inside the quiet Ottawa meeting that restarted military-to-military contact with Beijing, and why analysts want a fuller explanation from the federal government.
Canada China defence talks have restarted for the first time in more than eight years, with officials from both countries holding a “defence coordination dialogue” in Ottawa on Sept. 4. It is the first meeting of its kind since April 2018, and the clearest military-level signal yet that the deep freeze that gripped the relationship after Beijing jailed two Canadians in late 2018 is beginning to lift.
The meeting was small, technical and deliberately low-key. Fewer than 10 Canadian officials attended, drawn from the Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada, with ranks ranging from major-general down to colonel in the army and air force, the naval equivalent being captain. Nobody in Ottawa announced it. Beijing did.
Beijing Announced the Ottawa Meeting Before Canada Confirmed It
China’s Ministry of National Defense issued a statement the day after the dialogue, describing an exchange of views between the two sides on international and regional issues of shared interest, a stated willingness to strengthen practical contact between the two militaries, and improved mutual understanding and trust.
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government issued nothing to mark the occasion. Confirmation came only in response to media questions, when National Defence spokesperson Nick Drescher Brown acknowledged that Canadian and Chinese defence officials had met on Sept. 4 as part of ongoing working-level dialogue supporting military-to-military communication at the functional level.
The department framed the session as consistent with Canada’s broader defence engagement across the Indo-Pacific and anchored in protecting the safety of Canadians and the country’s strategic interests. It also noted a longstanding practice: the federal government does not normally publicize working-level meetings by officials.
Four Dialogues Between 2013 and 2018, Then Nothing
The defence coordination dialogue is not a new invention. Canada and China held four of them between 2013 and 2018, the last in April of that year. They are working-level sessions intended to let each side lay out priorities and concerns rather than negotiate agreements.
What ended them was the diplomatic rupture of late 2018. After Canadian authorities arrested a Chinese technology executive on a United States extradition request, Beijing detained Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. A federal cabinet minister at the time called the response “hostage diplomacy,” and the relationship effectively stopped functioning at almost every official level.
Why Carney Is Re-Engaging Beijing Now
The thaw is inseparable from trade. After U.S. President Donald Trump began imposing protectionist tariffs on Canada in 2025, Ottawa went looking for alternative markets, and in early 2026 Carney moved to rebuild ties with China, striking a strategic partnership in January. That pivot has already drawn criticism from Washington.
It is one strand of a broader diversification push. The same government has been courting Europe intensively, a effort visible in the offer of EU associate member status extended to Canada in Strasbourg and in Carney’s own response to that proposal. Read alongside the China file, the pattern is a deliberate hedge against dependence on a single trading partner.
Defence, however, was supposed to sit outside the warming trend. Drescher Brown said Canada’s renewed engagement with China is governed by guardrails, with specific areas identified for deeper cooperation and specific areas excluded — defence among them.
What a “Coordination Dialogue” Actually Is
The Canadian official who described the meeting on background played it down as routine: an exchange of views on regional and global security matters and a chance to communicate respective priorities and concerns. The content of the discussion was not disclosed.
For readers trying to place the event on a spectrum, the distinctions matter:
- Communication channel: a means of passing messages and reducing the risk that an accident escalates. This is how Ottawa is characterizing the Sept. 4 session.
- Cooperation: joint activity such as exercises, training or information sharing. National Defence says this remains off the table under the government’s guardrails.
- Working level versus political level: the Ottawa meeting involved officials, not ministers, and was not accompanied by any announced agreement.
Vina Nadjibulla Says Ottawa Owes Canadians an Explanation
Vina Nadjibulla, co-founder and chief executive officer of the Centre for Strategic Statecraft, argued the federal government should have explained the decision to reopen the channel rather than leaving Canadians to learn about it from a Chinese ministry statement.
“A lot has changed since Canada last conducted such dialogue with China in 2018,” she said, pointing to Beijing’s conduct in the South China Sea and around Taiwan as a continuing concern for Canada and its Indo-Pacific and European partners. Her central question is one of purpose: is the channel about risk management and crisis communication, or is it an extension of the January strategic partnership?
Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, an advisory board member at the China Strategic Risks Institute, raised a parallel concern, noting that Carney himself described China in 2025 as the top geopolitical threat. “What does this lead to? What are the guardrails? What subjects such as the Arctic are off limits?” she asked, adding that Chinese planning operates on very long timelines.
How the Indo-Pacific Changed While the Channel Was Closed
The strategic environment of 2026 is not the one that existed when the last dialogue was held. Chinese forces have become markedly more assertive in contested areas across the region, including close encounters with foreign aircraft, the use of maritime law enforcement vessels against Philippine resupply missions in the South China Sea, and stepped-up military activity near Taiwan.
Where Beijing once relied primarily on negotiation and economic leverage to advance its sovereignty claims, those claims are now routinely backed by naval deployments, combat aircraft and civilian-crewed flotillas.
Taiwan Strait Transits Remain Canada’s Sharpest Irritant With Beijing
Although the substance of the Sept. 4 talks was not made public, one recurring Chinese grievance is well documented: Canadian warships sailing through the Taiwan Strait. Canada frequently conducts these transits alongside the United States and other Western navies, treating the waterway as international — a position Washington frames as freedom of navigation operations and Beijing rejects.
The risks are not theoretical. In late 2023, then-defence minister Bill Blair accused Beijing of unsafe and unprofessional conduct after a Chinese military aircraft fired flares in front of a Canadian helicopter operating over international waters in the South China Sea.
Wayne Eyre Argues Talking to Rivals Prevents Accidents
Retired general Wayne Eyre, the former chief of the defence staff, read the dialogue as being about communication rather than cooperation, and said keeping lines open with rivals has historical value.
“Throughout history, maintaining communication with an adversary has been useful to deepen understanding and avoid unintended escalation,” he said, citing the Cold War hotline, the Pakistan-India hotline and the U.S.-Russia channel used during the Syrian conflict. He noted that during his service in Korea, a line to North Korea existed.
Eyre supports a standing channel with China but does not think a session of this type is sufficient. Meetings at the working level with China, he said, are infrequent and highly scripted. What Canada needs, in his view, is a dedicated higher-level direct channel capable of handling unintended incidents quickly enough to prevent escalation.
A Parallel U.S.-China Encounter in Victoria the Same Week
The Ottawa meeting did not happen in isolation. During the 28th Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference, held Aug. 31 to Sept. 2 in Victoria, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, met General Yang Zhibin, commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command.
At the same conference, General Jennie Carignan, Canada’s chief of the defence staff, described the political direction driving the shift plainly: “There is a clear demand from the government to recalibrate and realign our relationship with China.”
The Timeline at a Glance
| 2013–2018 | Canada and China hold four defence coordination dialogues |
| April 2018 | Last dialogue before the eight-year gap |
| Late 2018 | Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor jailed in China; relations freeze |
| Late 2023 | Canada accuses a Chinese warplane of firing flares near a Canadian helicopter |
| 2025 | U.S. tariffs prompt Canada to seek new markets; Carney calls China the top geopolitical threat |
| January 2026 | Carney government establishes a strategic partnership with China |
| Aug. 31–Sept. 2, 2026 | 28th Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference held in Victoria |
| Sept. 4, 2026 | Defence coordination dialogue held in Ottawa |
For now, the open question is not whether the channel exists but how far it goes. National Defence insists defence cooperation is excluded from the guardrails governing renewed engagement, while critics want that boundary spelled out in public — including whether Arctic security is explicitly off the agenda.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a defence coordination dialogue?
It is a working-level meeting between defence officials of two countries to exchange views on regional and global security issues and communicate each side’s priorities and concerns. It is not a negotiation and produced no announced agreement here.
Who attended from the Canadian side?
Fewer than 10 officials from the Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada, with ranks between major-general and colonel in the army and air force — colonel corresponding to captain in the navy.
Does this mean Canada and China are now cooperating militarily?
National Defence says no. The government’s stated guardrails identify defence as an area where Canada will not seek deeper cooperation with China, and officials describe the Sept. 4 session as communication at the functional level.
Why did Canada not announce the meeting?
The Department of National Defence said it is longstanding practice not to publicize working-level meetings by officials. The meeting became public through a statement from China’s Ministry of National Defense.
What was actually discussed?
Not disclosed. Beijing described a candid and in-depth exchange on international and regional issues, while the Canadian side characterized it as a routine exchange of views without releasing the agenda.
